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INTRODUCTION 
In this Policy Brief, I argue that we need to 
develop a coherent conception of a European 
Social Union. I use the expression ‘Social Union’ 
deliberately, for three reasons. First, it invites us 
to propose a clear-cut concept, in contrast to the 
rather vague notion of ‘a social Europe’, which 
often surfaces in discussions on the EU. Second, 
it signals that we should go beyond the 
conventional call for the EU to gain a ‘social 
dimension’. As a matter of fact, it would be 
wrong to assert that the EU has no social 
dimension today. The coordination of social 
security rights for mobile workers, standards for 
health and safety in the workplace, directives on 
workers’ rights… This constitutes a non-trivial 
acquis of fifty years of piecemeal progress. The 
EU also developed a solid legal foundation from 
which to enforce non-discrimination among EU 
citizens. The notion of a ‘European Social 
Union’ is not premised on a denial of that 
positive acquis. But if the next steps we have to 
take can build on that acquis, their nature and 
rationale respond to a new challenge. We have 
to understand the novelty of that challenge, 
which is about more than just adding ‘a social 
dimension’. Third, the emphasis on a Social 
Union is not a coincidence. A European Social 
Union is not a European Welfare State: it is a 
Union of national Welfare States.  
Proposing a European Social Union may seem 
an idealistic bridge too far, given the state of 
play of European politics today. However, I 
hope to show that the idea is neither far-fetched 
nor unduly idealistic. The core idea can be 
summarised as follows: a Social Union would 
support national welfare states on a systemic level 
in some of their key functions and guide the 
substantive development of national welfare states – 
via general social standards and objectives, 
leaving ways and means of social policy to 
Member States – on the basis of an operational 
definition of ‘the European social model’. In 
other words, European countries would 
This Policy Brief discusses the notion 
of a ‘European Social Union’, in which 
European countries would cooperate 
with an explicit social purpose. A 
European Social Union should not be 
seen as an idealistic bridge too far. 
Instead, a Social Union is both 
desirable and necessary for the 
eurozone and wider European 
integration. 
 Published in the framework of the Egmont project 
 
  
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
2 
 
cooperate in a union with an explicit social 
purpose – hence, the expression ‘European 
Social Union’ (ESU).  
From the outset, some misunderstandings 
should be avoided. Below I will insist on the 
necessity of convergence, but convergence is 
not the same as harmonisation. More generally, 
the practice of a Social Union should be far 
removed from a top-down, ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach to social policy-making in the Member 
States. Also, a Social Union is not a defensive 
‘Maginot line’ to preserve the social status quo; 
European welfare states are in a continuous 
process of reform and many need further 
reform. Finally, the notion of ESU does not 
point to a parallel and separate social pillar to be 
added to the existing pillars. 
A Social Union, so conceived, is not only 
desirable but necessary. To make that analysis is 
not to say that an operational concept of ESU is 
already on the table. We are in unchartered 
territory: important issues need to be clarified. 
First of all, we must be clear about the rationale 
and motivation for a ESU; that is the subject of 
the first part of this Policy Brief. In section 1, I 
distinguish arguments applying specifically to 
the eurozone from arguments applying to the 
EU as a whole. In section 2, I introduce the 
notion of solidarity underpinning a Social 
Union, and I argue that the idea of ESU marks a 
return to the inspiration of the founding fathers 
of the European project. The second part of this 
Policy Brief links the idea of a Social Union to 
current debates on social policy. Section 3 
presents ‘social investment’ as a unifying policy 
concept for the EU. Section 4 briefly argues that 
clarification is needed with regard to policy 
methodologies and tools (notably: 
mainstreaming, contractual arrangements, and a 
possible eurozone stabilisation scheme). Section 
5 discusses minimum wages and minimum 
income protection. Finally, a conclusion is 
provided. 
1. WHY DO WE NEED A EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL UNION? 
1.1. The incomplete monetary union 
The case for a European Social Union is first 
and foremost based on a functional argument 
with regard to EMU. Members of a currency 
area are confronted with a trade-off between 
symmetry and flexibility. In textbooks on 
monetary unions, the need for flexibility is 
explained in terms of wage and price flexibility, 
labour mobility, and migration, which determine 
a country’s internal adjustment capacity. 
Flexibility implies choices that are not socially 
neutral: less regulated labour markets, temporary 
shock absorbing mechanisms such as 
‘Kurzarbeit’ in Germany, a highly skilled and 
versatile labour force… All provide different 
ways and means to achieve labour market 
flexibility, which can be mixed in different ways, 
according to social preferences. There might be 
a ‘high road’ to labour market flexibility, based 
predominantly on skills, as opposed to a ‘low 
road’, based predominantly on mere 
deregulation of labour markets. Relying on 
migration as an adjustment variable and making 
a success of it, implies societal choices par 
excellence. 
Economic textbooks define symmetry in 
economic terms, but sustaining symmetry in the 
long run may imply a degree of social 
convergence: there seem to be limits to the 
diversity in social systems that can be 
accommodated in a monetary union, not with 
regard to the details of their organisation, but 
with regard to their fundamental parameters. 
The insistence of the European Commission 
that retirement ages be indexed on longevity in 
all European Member States can be interpreted 
in this sense: apart from the fact that it may be 
good policy per se, for any welfare state, to 
establish a link between retirement ages and 
longevity, it is plausible to argue that 
unsustainable pension systems in some Member 
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States of the eurozone would lead to budgetary 
imbalances that threaten the eurozone as such.  
The previous paragraph suggests the need of a 
long-term perspective of social convergence. 
From a short-term perspective, the automatic 
stabilisation capacity that normally characterises 
welfare states has been constrained by the actual 
functioning of EMU. Hence, EMU should be 
equipped with a stabilisation mechanism to 
compensate for the decreased stabilisation 
capacity of national welfare states. That 
presupposes more solidarity in the eurozone than 
is present at this moment. Neither flexibility nor 
symmetry, nor indeed a stabilisation mechanism, 
are socially neutral choices. By the process of 
monetary unification, a consensus on the social 
order which the monetary union has to serve is 
forced upon the participating countries. This 
entails discussions about sensitive social issues 
such as the degrees of freedom between 
countries with regard to pension systems and 
retirement age; but also with regard to the skills 
of their labour force and educational 
achievements; with regard to the role of 
migration, etc. 
We not only need a consensus on the concept; 
we also need a convergence of fundamental 
social parameters. What we see today is the 
exact opposite: increasing divergence which 
undermines the sustainability of the EMU. 
Excessive social imbalances threaten the monetary 
union as much as excessive economic 
imbalances (Vandenbroucke et al., 2013b). The 
expression ‘excessive social imbalances’ 
describes a set of social problems that affect 
member states very differently (thus creating 
‘imbalances’). Youth unemployment and child 
poverty are two examples. These imbalances 
should be a matter of common concern for all 
eurozone members. Politically, social divergence 
in the eurozone threatens the sustainability of 
the project in that it will steadily undermine the 
credibility of the European project. In economic 
terms, current levels of youth unemployment 
and child poverty in Europe illustrate inadequate 
investment in human capital on a massive scale. 
A comparatively high level of youth 
unemployment and child poverty is synonymous 
with an investment deficit that may be cause and 
effect in a vicious circle of underperforming 
labour markets, child care, education systems 
and transfer systems. If some members of the 
eurozone get trapped into such a vicious circle, 
the resulting bad equilibrium creates a problem 
with regard to the economic symmetry that is 
required among the members of a monetary 
union.  
In sum, (1) managing the trade-off between 
symmetry and flexibility, (2) repairing the 
decreased stabilisation capacity of welfare states, 
and (3) preventing excessive social imbalances 
presuppose an operational basic consensus on 
common, normatively charged objectives of 
social policy within the eurozone. 
1.2. Integration and social regulation in the 
EU28 
Other arguments in favour of adding an active 
social dimension to the EU transcend the 
eurozone problematic, as they apply to the EU 
as a whole. A well-known argument holds that 
economic integration without social 
harmonisation induces downward pressure on 
social development in the most advanced 
Member States. Although in the past the spectre 
of large-scale social dumping has never 
materialised, in the enlarged EU of today blatant 
cases of illegal working conditions and 
exploitation do occur, resulting from the 
interplay of lacunae in the domestic 
implementation of social and employment 
protection in the Member States, reduced legal 
sovereignty of the Member States, and the 
absence of common social standards in a very 
heterogeneous entity.  
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Fears of social dumping, but also welfare 
tourism, are causing considerable social and 
political tensions with regard to labour 
migration. These discussions will not be easily 
resolved, but a crucial condition for European 
public opinion to accept migration is that 
migration and posting of workers should fit into 
a regulated social order not undermine it. Hence 
the importance of the recent agreement reached 
by Social Affairs Ministers (December 2013) on 
the controversial posting-of-workers 
enforcement directive. The latter is supposed to 
resolve various legal, administrative and practical 
forms of abuse, circumvention of regulations, 
and fraudulent practices when workers are 
temporarily posted in another country. The 
revised directive now falls to negotiations 
between EU countries and the European 
Parliament.  
The extent to which Member States can uphold 
social standards in a context of free movement 
is particularly relevant with regard to minimum 
wages. In Member States such as Germany and 
Sweden, trade unions traditionally resisted state 
regulation of minimum wages: they considered 
that it fell under the purview of collective 
bargaining and that it was a no-go area for 
public authorities; thus, they applied a domestic 
principle of subsidiarity. The Viking and Laval 
judgments by the European Court of Justice 
suggest that that traditional position may be 
unsustainable: the Court argues that only 
predictable systems of minimum wage protection 
can be imposed on foreign companies that post 
workers, i.e. Member States must create a legal 
context in which only generally applicable 
minimum wage protection has to be respected 
by foreign service providers. If that argument is 
accepted, it would mean that social partners 
should reconsider traditional positions on 
subsidiarity within welfare states, i.e. they should 
reconsider the respective roles of social partners 
and public authorities, or reconsider the relation 
between nationwide collective bargaining and 
local bargaining. The actual responses in Sweden 
and Denmark to the Laval case reaffirm the 
autonomy of collective bargaining, but introduce 
conditions for the exercise of collective action: 
collective agreements can only be enforced 
through collective action against foreign service 
providers if they correspond to existing 
nationwide collective agreements and do not 
define conditions beyond the hard core of the 
posted workers directive (Blauberger, 2012). 
Hence, the Swedish and Danish domestic 
responses also change the rules of the game in 
terms of the subsidiarity of the national versus 
local level. Politically, this strengthens the case 
for a pan-European framework with regard to 
the concept and regulation of minimum wages: 
both at the domestic and the European level, we 
must reconsider the application of subsidiarity 
principles. 
Fundamentally, the challenge is to preserve the 
regulatory capacity of national governments and 
social partners, whilst allowing labour migration 
and the cross-border delivery of services. 
Reconciling national regulatory capacity with 
mobility has also constituted – and still 
constitutes – a challenge in the domain of health 
care. The impact of the European legal 
constellation – notably legislation shaping the 
internal market – on a sector such as health care 
shows that a neat separation between ‘market 
issues’, belonging to the supranational sphere, 
and ‘social issues’, belonging to the national 
spheres, is unsustainable. In 2002, I was inspired 
by this observation to propose a ‘horizontal 
social clause’ in the European legal architecture, 
to provide clearer guidance to all European 
institutions in the grey area between state and 
markets (Vandenbroucke, 2002). That idea 
found its way, via the Lisbon Treaty, into Article 
9 TFEU, which formulates the requirement that 
all EU actions take into account ‘the promotion 
of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, the fight against 
social exclusion, and a high level of education, 
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training and protection of human health’. Will 
this clause play an important role in guiding the 
Court of Justice and other key actors? Will it 
serve as a reference for social impact 
assessments? The jury is still out. So far, the 
horizontal social clause did not play a visible role 
when designing macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes – where it should have played a 
role. 
2. A SHARED NOTION OF SOLIDARITY 
The foregoing discussion shows that we have to 
combine two perspectives on the meaning of 
solidarity in Europe: a pan-European notion of 
solidarity and solidarity within national welfare 
states. The pan-European notion of solidarity 
refers to upward economic convergence and 
cohesion on a European scale. But it also refers 
to the rights of individuals to improve their own 
lives by working in a Member State other than 
the Member State where they were born, or to 
the rights of patients to benefit, under certain 
conditions, from medical care in other Member 
States than their state of residence, etc. Solidarity 
within national Member States refers to social 
insurance, income redistribution, and the 
balance of social rights and obligations, which 
define national welfare states. This dual 
perspective on solidarity – when used in the 
European context – makes it inherently complex 
and multifaceted. There should be no denying 
that it can imply trade-offs between national 
solidarity and pan-European solidarity, certainly 
in the short term. However, the political 
legitimacy of the European project depends on 
its capacity to avoid a negative trade-off or, in 
other words, to avoid a zero-sum game between 
national cohesion and pan-European cohesion. 
In yet other words, the legitimacy of the 
European project requires a virtuous circle of 
growing pan-European and national cohesion. 
Sustaining such a virtuous circle should be the 
primary objective of a European Social Union. 
In fact, this means that we should revisit the 
fundamental goals that have been part and 
parcel of the European project since the Treaty 
of Rome of 1957: the simultaneous pursuit of 
economic progress on the one hand, and of social 
progress and cohesion on the other, both within 
countries (through the gradual development of 
the welfare states) and between countries (through 
upward convergence across the Union). The 
founding fathers of the European project 
optimistically assumed that growing cohesion 
between and within countries could be reached 
by supranational economic cooperation, 
together with some specific instruments for 
raising the standard of living across the Member 
States (which were later brought together in the 
EU's ‘economic, social and territorial’ cohesion 
policy). Economic integration was to be 
organised at the EU level, and would boost 
economic growth and create upward 
convergence; domestic social policies were to 
redistribute the fruits of economic progress, 
while remaining a national prerogative. 
Consecutive enlargements as well as monetary 
unification made this complex notion of 
solidarity even more demanding and difficult to 
handle. Indeed, what is seen by some as ‘the 
dynamics of upward convergence’ associated 
with the enlargement of the EU, is seen as social 
dumping by others. At the same time, the 
discussion above demonstrated that monetary 
unification requires forms of solidarity which 
were, thus far, a no-go area in European politics. 
We risk getting caught in a trap: we badly need 
more European solidarity, whilst it is becoming 
more difficult to manage. Instead of a virtuous 
circle, that is a vicious circle.  
3. THE SOCIAL INVESTMENT IMPERATIVE  
How can we create a virtuous circle whereby 
both pan-European cohesion and national 
cohesion are enhanced? There is a huge disparity 
in the performance of European welfare states. 
They also display very different profiles with 
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regard to the educational achievement of their 
population. The southern EU15 Member States 
combine low employment rates with a high 
share of people with no more than lower 
secondary education. The OECD PISA tests of 
the skills of 15-year old students also illustrate 
the disparity across Europe with regard to 
investment in human capital in today’s younger 
generation, with weak average scores for 
countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain (and 
even weaker scores for Bulgaria and Romania). I 
do not suggest that there is a simple causal 
relationship between educational attainment and 
employment: it is the combination of a poor 
record in employment and education that is so 
alarming. These data not only illustrate the 
particular deficit of Southern eurozone welfare 
states – compared to other eurozone members – 
with regard to education and employment, they 
also underscore the huge education agenda the 
whole EU is confronted with. The European 
Union certainly recognises the challenge: in the 
Europe 2020 agenda, reducing the number of 
early school-leavers is singled out as one of the 
headline targets. The European Commission has 
developed a comprehensive agenda on 
education, training and skills, and issued 
excellent recommendations on the 
modernisation of education systems. However, 
the question remains as to whether this 
educational agenda carries sufficient weight at 
the highest levels of European political decision-
making and in the setting of budgetary priorities: 
the answer seems negative. Real public 
expenditure on education was lower in 2011 
than in pre-crisis 2008 in 10 Member States, 
including those that badly need to improve their 
education system. That is not to say that the 
quality of education systems can be measured in 
simply by looking at the level of public spending 
on education, but it seems very hard to improve 
education systems significantly whilst 
disinvesting. 
The strong record of Northern welfare states, 
with regard to both employment and poverty, 
has been linked to their long-term orientation 
towards ‘social investment’, i.e. activation, 
investment in human capital, and capacitating 
social services such as child care (Hemerijck, 
2013). Obviously, investment in education and 
child care are no panacea; welfare states also 
differ with regard to the effectiveness of their 
social protection systems. For instance, Greece 
does not have a system of minimum income 
assistance, and minimum income protection in 
Italy is generally considered to be inadequate. 
Cash transfer systems are highly fragmented in a 
number of welfare states. Welfare state 
performance depends on the complementarity 
of effective investment in human capital – by 
means of education, training and child care – 
and effective protection of human capital – by 
means of adequate transfer systems and health 
care. The redistributive role of social protection 
remains important per se (Cantillon and 
Vandenbroucke, 2014). 
So conceived, a social investment strategy offers 
an interesting perspective, with regard to both 
pan-European cohesion and national cohesion. 
Social investment emerged gradually as a social 
policy perspective in the 1990s in response to 
fundamental changes in our societies, with a 
focus on policies that ‘prepare’ individuals, 
families, and societies to adapt to various 
transformations (such as changing career 
patterns and working conditions, the emergence 
of new social risks, and ageing populations) 
rather than on simply generating responses 
aimed at ‘repairing’ damage caused by market 
failure, social misfortune, poor health, or 
prevailing policy inadequacies. Social investment 
is not an easy panacea. Successful social 
investment presupposes a well-designed 
complementarity between ‘protecting human 
capital’ by means of traditional instruments of 
social protection (cash benefits, health care) and 
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‘developing human capital’, by means of 
education, training and activation. 
The Social Investment Package, launched by the 
European Commission (2013a) in February 
2013, presents a similar argument and provides 
an interesting common orientation for EU 
Member States with its focus on early childhood 
education and care, preventing early school 
leaving, lifelong learning, affordable child care 
(as part of an active inclusion strategy), housing 
support (fighting homelessness), accessible 
health services and helping people live 
independently in old age. Together with Anton 
Hemerijck and Bruno Palier, I called for a true 
‘Social Investment Pact’ for the EU 
(Vandenbroucke, Hemerijck, Palier, 2011). 
Obviously, a ‘Package’ is not a ‘Pact’; the idea of 
a ‘Pact’ underscores the sense of reciprocity that 
is needed: all Member States should be 
committed to policies that respond to the need 
for social investment; simultaneously, Member 
States’ efforts in this direction – notably efforts 
by Member States who face a difficult budgetary 
and economic context – should be supported in 
a tangible way. 
4. THE NEED TO CLARIFY POLICY 
METHODS AND TOOLS 
In section 1, I wrote that excessive social imbalances 
threaten the monetary union as much as 
excessive economic imbalances. The first step to 
restoring (upward) convergence is to fight such 
excessive social imbalances, notably within the 
eurozone. This requires a toolkit, in which three 
types of instrument are made to work in the 
same direction: general mainstreaming, 
contractual arrangements, and the European 
Funds.  
Fernandes and Maslauskaite (2013a) rightly 
argue that the social dimension should be 
mainstreamed into all EU policies, notably into 
macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance, 
rather than it being constituted as a separate 
social pillar. In principle, the Europe 2020 frame 
should guarantee such mainstreaming; in 
practice, the social and education objectives of 
Europe 2020 do not carry the same weight as the 
economic and budgetary objectives. This is, first 
and foremost, a political problem, and solving it 
presupposes the willingness to take social 
objectives into account at the highest level of 
EU decision-making. But apart from that, 
although the notion of mainstreaming seems 
straightforward, clarification is needed about the 
institutional actors that should take the lead in it 
and exactly how this should be done. Refining 
the MIP Scoreboard, which is used in the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, was a 
first step towards such mainstreaming. Social 
and employment indicators have indeed been 
added to the set of ‘auxiliary indicators’ that are 
used in the economic reading of the MIP 
Scoreboard. However, some nervousness exists 
about the ownership and control of the process 
in which they will be used. As a matter of fact, 
there is more than one ‘scoreboard’. Next to the 
auxiliary indicators in the MIP, a scoreboard of 
(a few) employment and social indicators was 
adopted by the EPSCO Council in December 
2013, to inform macroeconomic and fiscal 
policies, both at EU and national levels, in the 
context of the European Semester. In itself, that 
can be seen as promising. However, the 
European Council’s confirmation of “the 
relevance of the use of a scoreboard of key 
employment and social indicators” (European 
Council, 2013: §38) and especially that “the use 
of this wider range of indicators will have the 
sole purpose of allowing a broader 
understanding of social developments” (Ibid: 
§39) is unsatisfactory. The precise role of this 
new scoreboard vis-à-vis the strong analytical 
tools developed recently by the EPSCO Council 
– the Employment Performance Monitor and 
Social Protection Performance Monitor – 
should be further defined. Finally, 
mainstreaming should include monitoring the 
impact of social and labour market reforms in 
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Member States having signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding. In short, if mainstreaming social 
policy objectives is deemed necessary, the 
content, the process, and the role of the 
different policy strands have to be clarified, in 
order to make such mainstreaming effective and 
legitimate in the perception of all actors 
involved.  
Well-conceived contractual arrangements 
between the EU and the Member States – 
proposed by the European Commission as part 
of a ‘convergence and competitiveness 
instrument’ (European Commission, 2012, 
2013b) – may be a way forward if they are based 
on the genuine reciprocity that is objectively 
needed in the EU today. The idea of contractual 
arrangements raises many issues, as explained in 
the Egmont Institute Policy Brief by Vanden 
Bosch and Verhelst (2014). The key question is 
whether the contracts envisage a bilateral top-
down approach with the Council and the 
Commission dictating policies to specific 
countries (a ‘principal-agent model’ with 
financial incentives), or alternatively, solidarity in 
commonly agreed structural welfare state 
reform. In the run-up to the December Council, 
many governments, including the Belgian 
government, have taken a rather defensive 
approach in the discussion about contractual 
arrangements. In a sense, this is understandable, 
given the impression that these contracts would 
simply reinforce a top-down implementation 
model of policies that are controversial in 
Member States. However, a less defensive 
approach in this debate is needed if one wants 
to turn the proposal into ‘solidarity in structural 
welfare reform’. So conceived, the questions at 
hand echo the questions raised with regard to 
the European funds. Cohesion policy is 
supporting ‘inclusive growth’ more effectively 
than it did before, mainly thanks to a 
concentration of efforts. The case could be 
made that not only the ESF, but also the ERDF 
and other funds should support the employment 
and social policy thematic objectives, and have 
corresponding social investment priorities. 
There is a risk that the contractual arrangements 
overlap with existing cohesion policy 
programmes with a clear social commitment. 
Contractual arrangements and cohesion policy 
operational programmes should be made 
consistent and complementary policy tools, in 
order to increase – instead of merely substitute – 
efforts at the EU level in employment and social 
policies. 
The paragraph focused on solidarity in structural 
reform. A separate question concerns the 
organisation of solidarity in adverse cyclical 
circumstances. For the sake of brevity, I will not 
develop this important issue here; I refer the 
reader to the Policy Brief by Vanden Bosch and 
Verhelst (2014). 
5. MINIMUM WAGES AND MINIMUM 
INCOME PROTECTION 
In their joint statement of 29 May 2013, France 
and Germany proposed ‘considering implementing 
minimum wage floors, defined at national level that 
would guarantee a high level of employment and fair 
wages – leaving the choice between legislation and 
collective-bargaining agreements.’ Interestingly, this 
joint statement immediately added a 
consideration on the enhancement of cross-
border mobility, ‘calling for encouraging cross-border 
worker mobility by removing obstacles, improving 
cooperation between employment services (building upon 
the EURES platform) and facilitating the portability of 
rights in case of mobility’ (Bundesregierung (2013)). 
This lends support to the idea that cross-border 
mobility is a positive development, if organised 
in compliance with existing social regulation, 
such as decent minimum wages.  
Eurofound (2013) published an in-depth 
investigation of proposals with regard to 
European minimum wage coordination. It 
shows that a European minimum wage 
threshold at 60% of national median wages 
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would be very demanding in terms of the 
number of workers affected and the increase in 
wage levels at the bottom end of the income 
distribution. A pan-European approach would 
also encounter huge institutional difficulties, 
given the differences in wage-setting institutions 
across the EU. Simultaneously, the report notes 
a number of arguments in favour of minimum 
wage coordination at the European level, such 
as the fact that it would minimise the negative 
effects on intra-European competitiveness. A 
gradual approach might therefore be 
appropriate. The report also underscores that 
the main justification for minimum wages is not 
the reduction of poverty (the impact on poverty 
is rather limited, since household poverty is 
more related to not working at all than to having 
low wages); the essential – and important – 
justification for minimum wages is the 
establishment of minimum labour standards 
below which no employment relationship is 
considered socially acceptable.  
With regard to fighting poverty, the EAPN 
(European Anti-Poverty Network) proposes a 
draft directive on adequate minimum income. It 
would stipulate that ‘every Member State shall 
introduce a minimum income scheme, that 
guarantees the right to an adequate minimum 
income to all people living on their territory’ 
(EAPN, 2010). The objective would be to 
ensure that the combined effect of their 
minimum income provisions and other policy 
measures are sufficient to lift all individuals 
above the poverty threshold (60% of the 
national median income, in a first stage). A 
European framework with regard to minimum 
income protection would indeed give substance 
and political salience to social rights in a ‘caring 
Europe’. But, given the heterogeneity between 
European Member States, any binding 
agreements on minimum income would have to 
be introduced flexibly and gradually, and 
implemented in unison with a convergence in 
activation measures and minimum wage 
(Vandenbroucke et al, 2013a). Moreover, since 
such a scheme – even if it is moderate in its 
initial ambition – requires a significantly greater 
budgetary effort on behalf of some of the 
poorer Member States in Eastern and Southern 
Europe, it raises a complex question about the 
meaning of solidarity within the EU.  
In the poorer Member States ‘the rich’ are 
poorer than ‘the poor’ in the richer Member 
States. Hence, a minimal condition for a ‘caring 
Europe’, that attempts to upscale minimum 
income protection, is that it should help the 
poorer Member States, not just by opening up 
markets and implementing successful macro-
economic policies at the EU level, but also by 
putting at their disposal generous Structural 
Funds for the foreseeable future. 
Simultaneously, a caring Europe would put 
positive pressure on poorer and richer Member 
States to gradually improve the overall quality 
and efficiency of their welfare regimes. 
Introducing conditionality with regard to aspects 
of social inclusion policy in the European Social 
Fund may be one way to develop more leverage. 
Simultaneously, existing strategies – notably 
Europe 2020 – should be taken seriously and 
given real bite. If this were the overall context, 
then the prospect of gradually introducing a 
more binding EU framework on minimum 
income protection may become realistic and 
useful, for the political reasons indicated above 
and as a measure to increase the quality and 
efficiency of domestic social systems. 
Fundamentally, enhanced solidarity within 
Member States cannot be decoupled from 
enhanced solidarity among Member States – and 
vice versa. 
CONCLUSIONS: FROM A SENSE OF 
SURVIVAL TO A SENSE OF COMMON 
PURPOSE 
The eurozone must be supplemented with a 
genuine social dimension for it to be sustainable 
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in the long term. A Social Union would support 
national welfare states on a systemic level in some 
of their key functions (such as macroeconomic 
stabilisation) and guide the substantive development 
of national welfare states – via general social 
standards and objectives, leaving ways and 
means of social policy to Member States – on 
the basis of an operational definition of ‘the 
European social model’. In other words, 
European countries would cooperate in a union 
with an explicit social purpose – hence, the 
expression ‘European Social Union’. Such a 
ESU is not only desirable, it is also necessary.  
My arguments with regard to EMU are premised 
on the idea that the tuning of economic 
strategies requires a minimal tuning of social 
policy, even if this should not lead to the 
application of an undifferentiated social policy: 
Member States should retain sovereignty in 
specific areas (e.g. the organisation of health 
care), and they must be able to effectively 
assume the responsibilities they bear. That is one 
of the reasons why the idea of a Social Union is 
not confined to the eurozone, although some 
specific arguments only apply to the eurozone. 
At the level of the EU28, we must deepen our 
mutual understanding of the social goals to be 
achieved by market integration and the mobility 
of people, services, goods and capital; and it 
must be possible to maintain principles of social 
regulation that serve those goals.  
The practice of a Social Union should be far 
removed from a top-down, ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to social policy-making in the Member 
States. What is needed today is a more balanced 
approach to macro-economic coordination, i.e. a 
combination of greater room for manoeuvre 
and tangible support for Member States that opt 
for a social investment strategy, and policy 
guidance based on clear and sufficiently 
stringent and constraining objectives with regard 
to well-defined social outcomes on the one 
hand, and genuine scope for exploration and 
mutual learning on the ways and means to 
achieve those outcomes on the other hand. 
A Social Union is not a defensive Maginot Line 
to fight yesterday’s battles: we need reform, not 
a status quo. In policy terms, the challenge is to 
make long-term social investments and medium-
term fiscal consolidation mutually supportive and 
sustainable, under improved financial and 
economic governance. In political terms, 
European citizens need a reformist perspective 
that gives the social acquis they cherish a credible 
future. A European Social Union should build 
on that acquis; simultaneously, building on that 
acquis requires reform. That is the quintessence 
of the call for a ‘social investment pact’. 
At the moment of writing, signs of economic 
recovery are getting stronger. Maybe, the actions 
of the Member States will no longer be guided 
by day-to-day crisis management. However, 
without a sense of common purpose, it will not 
be possible to overcome the legacy of the crisis; 
it will not be possible to avoid the spectre of 
sluggish economic growth for many years; and it 
will not be possible to fight the mounting 
euroscepticism.1 Moving from a ‘sense of 
survival’ to a ‘sense of common purpose’ is a 
basic condition for building a Social Union.  
Frank Vandenbroucke is Professor at the 
KU Leuven and Belgian Minister of State. 
This Policy Brief draws on a report 
published by Friends of Europe, ‘A 
European Social Union: 10 tough nuts to 
crack’ (Vandenbroucke, with Bart 
Vanhercke, 2014). 
This Policy Brief is part of the publication 
series “The Citizen and the European 
Elections”. The project intends to bring the 
debate on the European elections closer to 
the citizens, by focusing on those EU issues 
that are of particular importance to them.
  
ENDNOTE 
1 See Fernandes & Maslauskaite (2013b), who’s Scenario C also inspired the subtitle of this section. 
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